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REMARKS
THE RETREAT OF PROFESSIONALISM IN
BUSINESS EDUCATION
RAKESH KHURANA*
I. DISTRUST OF BUSINESS EDUCATION
First of all, thank you for inviting me and giving me the opportunity to
speak today on an essential and important subject: the restoration of trust,
not only to our businesses but also to our institutions in general.
If you look at the most recent Pew and Edelman surveys, our leaders in
society are now the least trusted they have ever been since these polls were
begun just after World War II.1 Business leaders are now the least trusted
individuals in society. In fact, they now rank lower than Washington politi-
cians.2 If you are a person from a business school—like I am—who cares
about the free enterprise system and capitalism, it is time to address this
important issue.
I want to talk a bit about business education. In many ways, it is the
great success story of graduate education over the past hundred years. Busi-
ness schools have become one of the most important components of higher
education. The degree has been institutionalized. Almost every major public
university now offers some form of business education, either at the under-
graduate or graduate level.
Business education is found in many of our most elite research univer-
sities. It is a global degree, unlike many other degrees. For example, law is
often specific to the federal or state jurisdiction in which you are located;
and, while arguably the human body is a universal entity, medicine is often
restricted to a particular jurisdiction, too. The MBA itself, though, is often
regarded as an elite global degree.
* Marvin Bower Professor of Leadership Development, Harvard Business School.
1. See EDELMAN, 2009 EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2009); PEW
GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, AMERICA’S IMAGE SLIPS, BUT ALLIES SHARE U.S. CONCERNS OVER
IRAN, HAMAS 11–12 (June 2006).
2. See, e.g., Paul Steinhauser, Poll: Politicians Trusted More than Business Leaders on
Economy, CNN, Feb. 23, 2009, available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/23/poll.
economy/index.html.
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In many of our highest-paying occupations, an MBA is a virtual pre-
requisite. There has been an illustrious list of MBA graduates in America’s
top corporate, financial, and government positions. In fact, the last adminis-
tration was called the “MBA Administration,” which may give you some
hint about the state of business education.
If you look at CEOs with MBAs from the major universities, you will
see that there has been a dramatic increase in terms of the Fortune 500:
more than two-thirds of those CEOs have MBAs, with the largest coming
from some of the older institutions like Harvard, from which I hail. Given
the success of that, though, there is also a great deal of anxiety and worry
concerning the future of the free market system and where it stands right
now.3
There is also a lot of anger. There have been protests in Iceland,
France, England, and Russia4 in response to the financial crisis and the fair-
ness in the social order. On today’s cover of the USA Today, there was a
picture of many people protesting against the bonuses paid at AIG in Con-
gress.5 Some of that anger has also been directed at the institution that I
have been part of for the last twenty years of my life, the MBA education.
You can see this anger in many different forms and corners.
On March 1, 2009, the New York Times printed several letters to the
editor regarding an earlier piece about the pressure on the humanities to
justify their existence in these trying economic times.6 Several letters de-
scribed the importance of critical thinking and moral reasoning in the stud-
ies of the humanities, something that they saw lacking in both MBA
education and many of our business leaders both inside finance as well as in
other industries such as the automobile industry.7 For example, one individ-
ual argued that “[t]he subtleties of civilized living require an understanding
of human functioning through centuries of ethical dilemmas, missteps and
their consequences. . . . [I]t is not a trivial matter to be left to MBAs. We’ve
tried that already.”8
3. See, e.g., World on the Edge, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2008; Saving the System, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2008; What Went Wrong, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2008.
4. See Iceland Protest Ends in Clashes, BBC NEWS, Nov. 23, 2008, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7744355.stm; Thomson Reuters, FACTBOX: Financial Unrest in Eu-
rope, Feb. 26, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLQ87702?sp=
true; Tom Parfitt, Russia Rocked by Financial Crisis Protests, THE OBSERVER, Feb. 1, 2009.
5. Judy Keen, AIG Chief Gets Capitol Hill Grilling over Bonuses, USA TODAY, Mar. 19,
2009.
6. Letters to the Editor, Humanities and the Examined Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/opinion/l02humanities.html (commenting on
Patricia Cohen, In Tough Times, the Humanities Must Justify Their Worth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/books/25human.html); see also Joel M.
Podolny, The Buck Stops (and Starts) at Business School, HARV. BUS. REV., June 1, 2009, availa-
ble at http://hbr.harvardbusiness.org/2009/06/the-buck-stops-and-starts-at-businessschool/ar/1.
7. Id.
8. John W. Worsham, Letter to the Editor, Humanities and the Examined Life, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/opinion/l02humanities.html (com-
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Internationally, where the MBA degree has grown fairly dramatically,
there was an op-ed published in The Times of London in which the writer
said, “If Robespierre were to ascend from hell and seek out today’s guillo-
tine fodder, he might start with a list of those with three incriminating ini-
tials beside their names: MBA.”9 Interestingly, the writer continues,
From Royal Bank of Scotland to Merrill Lynch, from HBOS to
Lehman Brothers, the Masters of Disasters have their finger prints
on every recent financial fiasco. I write as the holder of an MBA
from Harvard Business School—once regarded as a golden ticket
to riches, but these days more like scarlet letters of shame.10
I draw this to your attention because, obviously, it is a little cheeky. I
would, though, take exception with some of these letter writers about the
details. I know there are business school faculty, not only in my own insti-
tution but across the United States, who care very deeply about these issues.
The truth is that even before the financial meltdown there was substan-
tial evidence inside business schools that something had fundamentally
changed in MBA education. We did not need the financial meltdown of
2008. We had already had Enron and WorldCom. Many business school
faculty had a sense that our siloed and functional faculty was both narrow-
ing research and leading students to an incomplete view of the firm and
society.
Not too long after the Enron meltdown, Robert Shiller, the Yale econo-
mist, had published an editorial about what was happening in MBA educa-
tion.11 He said that the world view was that the MBA education was not
only a morally neutral education, but was actually imposing a moral con-
tent.12 He wrote, “the view of the world that one gets in a modern business
curriculum can lead to an ethical disconnect. The courses often encourage a
view of human nature that does not inspire high-mindedness.”13
Maureen Tkacik, an ethnographer and journalist who was studying
Wharton MBAs, found, after a two-year ethnography, that “[t]he MBA
above all teaches people to act like corporations, to follow the path of high-
est return on investment (ROI). Humans don’t know how to act like humans
menting on Patricia Cohen, In Tough Times, the Humanities Must Justify Their Worth, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/books/25human.html).
9. Philip Delves Broughton, Harvard’s Masters of the Apocalypse, TIMES (London), Mar. 1,
2009, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/education/article5821706.ece.
10. Id.
11. Robert J. Shiller, Op-Ed., How Wall Street Learns to Look the Other Way, N.Y. TIMES,




\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-2\UST210.txt unknown Seq: 4 10-AUG-09 14:18
436 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:2
anymore. Instead they are drones, vassals to their massive debt loads for
whom reflection and critical thinking are not useful offsetting assets.”14
What the MBA even means anymore is under question. There is no
longer an agreement about how long an MBA program needs to be. There
are still some of the traditional full-time two-year programs like the one that
I come from, but the fastest growing MBA programs in the United States
are one-year, online programs.15
Moreover, even among the elite schools there is no longer agreement
about what courses should be required. For example, at Stanford and the
University of Chicago, there is no longer a required curriculum because the
faculty cannot agree on what it is that students need to know. This is pre-
cisely an example of what Professor Coffee raised. Competition has been a
race to the bottom among MBA programs. At many schools, you give them
the money and they will, essentially, give you the degree.
Unlike the traditional high professions of law and medicine, the barrier
to entry is quite low. The number of law schools and medical schools has
not increased dramatically, whereas MBA education has gone from 138
schools in 1955 to more than 955 today, two-thirds of which are unac-
credited programs.16
The fact is, we do not know what we should research. Increasingly,
there is a lack of agreement among the faculty when it comes to promotion
and tenure standards, and with regards to what constitutes research.17 Is it
theory? Is it contribution to the discipline? Or, is it contribution to manage-
rial knowledge?
I do not want to spend a lot of time talking about the academic ele-
ments, but this has been quite well known even among faculty at institu-
tions like mine: you are better off going up as a sociologist, economist, or
psychologist for your tenure rather than saying you are a management re-
searcher, because those degrees are valued more.
In fact, this reality has decoupled the degree and largely made it more
of a credentialing process than one contributing any substantive body of
knowledge. Finally, our students’ motivations for completing the MBA
have changed. Students largely see an elite MBA education as an opportu-
nity to develop elite social networks rather than to get an education.
In a story from The New York Times, an MBA student said,
14. Maureen Tkacik, Is Wharton Ruining American Business?, PHILADELPHIA MAG., at 4,
available at http://www.phillymag.com/articles/feature_is_wharton_ruining_american_business/.
15. See GRADUATE MANAGEMENT ADMISSION COUNCIL, APPLICATION TRENDS SURVEY 5–6
(2007).
16. RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS 338 (2007).
17. See generally AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGIATE SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS INT’L, IM-
PACT OF RESEARCH (2008), available at http://www.aacsb.edu/Resource_Centers/Research/Final/
Impact_of_Research_Report-FINAL.PDF; Rajshree Agarwal & Glenn Hoetker, A Faustian Bar-
gain? The Growth of Management and Its Relationship with Related Disciplines, 50 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 1304 (2007).
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I saw that people that had been working for 20 years did have
MBA’s, but people five to six years older than me were not go-
ing . . . . Going to business school is a way for people to try to
open the door, to try to get into a company or hedge fund. But if
you’re already there, it doesn’t make sense to go.18
Scott Snook,19 a colleague of mine who has been following fifty
Harvard MBAs, finds that most students largely regard the MBA as a
networking opportunity. Students will often say,
You see that I made this my life now. It is very all-encompassing.
On the one hand I have very little time and people will say to me,
‘well, why are you spending so much time doing what you’re
doing? You don’t have to go to all these events.’ In a sense I feel
like I do. I want to. It is fun, and that is what I am here to do. I am
here to meet people. I am here to hang out. I am here to build a
real network of friends and people whom I will eventually have
some sort of professional existence with.
One consequence of this mentality is that there are also business
schools that largely present themselves as networking opportunities and not
for their educational value. For example, schools that advertise in airplane
magazines largely present themselves on the ROI you get in terms of the
starting salary if you attend this particular business school versus another
business school. The fact that it is a graduate school that advertises in
magazines that you find in airplanes is another issue.
II. A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF BUSINESS EDUCATION
I want to tell you, in fifteen minutes, how we got here. I am going to
condense a hundred-year history pretty quickly.
The original intention of the founding of the university-based business
school was to create management as a profession.20 By profession, I mean
not only the technical aspects of our profession in terms of mastering a
body of knowledge and the difference between an expert and a novice, but
also a profession in its normative sense. This is very much like Judge Chan-
dler just talked about: a sense of obligation, a sense of duty, and a sense of
putting the interest of society ahead of one’s own self-interest.21 That was
the basis around which business education came to be established.
I want to talk about how that happened—how that project got aban-
doned and subsequently replaced with a very narrowing view of the purpose
of the corporation, and the purpose of management, in the United States.
18. Louise Story, Bye, Bye B-School, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at 31, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/business/16mba.html.
19. Associate Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School.
20. KHURANA, supra note 16.
21. See William B. Chandler III, The Delaware Court of Chancery and the Public Trust, 6 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 421, 423 (2009).
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The original arena in which professional education and business
merged was at the crux of the shift from agrarian to industrial society in the
late-19th century and early-20th century.22 That period of time in the
United States was a period of a great deal of social unrest. There were
questions of who should control the large corporation, or if the large corpo-
ration, itself should be broken up. In a country with Jeffersonian ideals, the
notion that the large institutions of private power increasingly exerted
power over individuals was of great question.23
Should the corporation be run in the interest of capital the way it was,
through the shareholders? Should it be run in the interest of labor through
the unions? Or should it be run in the interest of the state through regula-
tors? Individuals called managers began to argue that they would run the
corporation not in the best interest of capital, labor, or the state, but in the
best interest of society.
The fact that managers could be trusted to have the prerogative over
what should happen to corporations brought about the debate concerning
corporate governance and the role of shareholders, as emphasized by
Lizanne.24 That is how we created the strong manager/weak owner regime
that we have in the United States, as Harvard law school professor Mark
Roe describes.25 For example, when the University of Michigan considered
founding its business school, many received a letter from Edward Jones,
one of the faculty members in the business school, talking about why it is
that the University of Michigan should have a business school. He argued
that “[t]he first generation of great ‘captains of industry’ in this country was
composed of men of exceptional native powers who fought their way up-
ward . . . .”26 This is sort of the Horatio Alger great man story. “[A] notable
change has been taking place in the character of our industrial leadership.
The sons of the pioneers, reared in self-indulgence, do not as a rule show
either the ability or the desire to take the place of their fathers as leaders.”27
Right? Turns out, yes, you cannot inherit that quality. But, he also said:
There has begun to emerge a special class of administrators, who
are not capitalists, but stand midway between the multitude of
stock and bond owners on the one side, and the wage-earning
classes and the public as consumers on the other.
This special class is more and more becoming responsible
for the inauguration and execution of industrial and commercial
policies. It is the great opportunity of this college to assist this
22. KHURANA, supra note 16, at 25–26.
23. Id. at 33.
24. Lizanne Thomas, Beyond What is Defensible to What is Right, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 427,
428–29 (2009).
25. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994).
26. Edward D. Jones, Some Propositions Concerning University Instruction in Business Ad-
ministration, 21 J. POL. ECON. 185, 187 (1913).
27. Id.
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rising profession to a consciousness of itself, to help it realize its
trusteeship, and to stimulate it to conceive itself as an intellectual
aristocracy in the world of affairs.
By affording the scientific training and the knowledge of the
basic principles of administration, properly buttressed by harmo-
nious minor technical principals, the college may assist in making
good the expectation, everywhere gaining ground in industry, that
a new, high, fine, scientific, industrial leadership is about to come
into existence.28
There are three important elements here. One was that management
was becoming a profession, and a profession not only in its kind of respon-
sibilities from a technical perspective but also in its normative
responsibilities.
Second is the notion of science. Business education becomes part of a
university through science. There is a belief that a body of knowledge needs
to be mastered. You also want that knowledge to be used for the social
good. This was the argument against the for-profit commercial business
schools that existed in the United States. These schools were educating hun-
dreds of thousands of people. They were delegitimized because, it was ar-
gued, they did not infuse students with any sense of calling or vocation for
their job.
The third thing is that business education belongs in a university be-
cause there will be continual research to bring forth. The flip side to under-
standing this is that it is not a group of managers calling for a profession,
but, rather, the academy.
Unlike the other traditional high professions of medicine and law, in
which there was often a vanguard of practitioners who were themselves
leading the call for professionals, here the idea was: if you build the school,
the profession will come. This was a significant challenge for business edu-
cation, especially with the incredible disorder that large corporations
presented in the United States.
In the mid- to late-19th century there were significant changes that
made it increasingly easier to form corporations. Prior to the mid-19th cen-
tury, to form a corporation, as opposed to a partnership, you had to have a
special act of legislature by the state.29 When that process shifted so that
basically anyone could incorporate, there was a growth in the number of
corporations, from literally only dozens in the United States to ten thousand
incorporations happening each year in New Jersey, Ohio, and similar
places.30
28. Id. at 187–88.
29. KHURANA, supra note 16, at 37.
30. Id. at 33 (citing GEORGE HERBERTON EVANS, JR., BUSINESS INCORPORATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1800–1943 (1948)).
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These corporations were not just numerous; they were large and in-
creasingly exerted a great deal of impact in the United States. They became
the primary agent to which action and responsibility were attributed. No
longer was it, “John D. Rockefeller did this.” It was, “Standard Oil did
this.” No longer was it that “B.F. Goodrich did this.” It was “the Goodrich
Company did this.” The corporation had become the primary agent in the
United States.
As we all know, the United States has the most violent labor history of
any industrialized country in the world.31 There was a great deal of labor
violence in the United States which was creating a sense of disorder, and
there were huge numbers of hearings about how to regulate the corporation.
It was in this mix, in this kind of socio-political-economic pool, that manag-
ers—this group that was neither capital, nor labor, nor the state—would run
the corporation in the best interest of society. They would run it as
professionals.
Owen Young, who was the Chairman of General Electric and one of
the individuals who helped lead this effort along with Louis Brandeis,
talked about this at the inauguration of the Harvard Business School. Young
argued that the formation of the Harvard Business School meant that,
[t]oday the profession of business at Harvard formally makes its
bow to its older brothers and holds its head high with the faith of
youth. . . .Today we light the fires in the temple which it is the
trust of Harvard to maintain . . . and from which there may be
renewed through generation after generation the high ideals, the
sound principals, the glorious traditions which make a profession.
Today and here business formally assumes the obligations of a
profession, which means responsible action as a group, devotion
to its own ideals, the creation of its own codes, the capacity for its
honors and the responsibility for its own discipline; the awards of
its own service.32
You can only say this at Harvard. You could not imagine Jack Welch
saying this. This showed, again, the linkages between management and sci-
ence, the professions, and the university. What is interesting is that it was
not to the technical principles they appealed, but to the normative value of
what each of those institutions meant.
As managerial authority and science became linked, it was science that
would lead to a disinterested way of solving the problems between capital
and labor in terms of how people and organizations should be managed.33
The idea was that this type of management would help reduce social dis-
31. Yehouda Shenhav, From Chaos to Systems: The Engineering Foundations of Organiza-
tion Theory, 1879–1932, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 557, 566–67 (1995).
32. KHURANA, supra note 16, at 118 (quoting Owen D. Young, Dedication Address, in Dedi-
cation Addresses, 5 HARV. BUS. REV. 385 (1927)).
33. See generally KHURANA, supra note 16, at 51–85.
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trust. If the manager was ever to see himself other than the hired hand, he
had to believe that the public interest was what mattered, rather than private
interest.
This framing had a huge success in the United States. Once manage-
ment and management education were framed in this way, there was a dra-
matic decline in the for-profit management education world and a huge
increase in university-based management education.
III. DRAMATIC INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF BUSINESS SCHOOLS IN THE
UNITED STATES
Business education had been built on a Field of Dreams, that is, if we
build it the profession will follow. Important questions remained unan-
swered, such as: Who should teach, what should they be researching and
who are the students?
If you look at the leading business schools and those established first,
there was no agreement among the faculty. Less than half of the faculty had
PhDs, and a number of them were lawyers or accountants. This was true
even at fairly elite schools like Columbia, Dartmouth, Harvard, and places
like Illinois and Michigan. For example, there were required courses such
as accounting and economics, which are common today. Also, though, there
were other required courses, such as English and law.34 None of these
courses are required today. Other courses which were not required at all,
like organizational behavior or personnel management—issues around psy-
chology which were very uncommon—now often form the staple of many
business schools. Previously, there were a variety of different subjects that
counted toward the business major. In some cases there were courses like
“Trading Routes in Early Roman Empire” that counted towards a business
major. It was a very inchoate field.
This did not stop students from studying business. By the 1920s, busi-
ness replaced engineering as the most common major in the United States,
and today, more than one out of seven degrees granted at the undergraduate
level in the United States are business degrees. More than a quarter of all
graduate degrees are business degrees.
The problem was that the student quality was not that great. In fact,
business school students were among the weakest of all the students in the
university setting. And at first people would say, “Well, you know, it de-
pends how you measure it.” But if you look even on verbal skills you could
say, “Well, business people tend to be analytical and business school stu-
dents were the worst off.” Even on math and more quantitative skills, busi-
ness students were often not as qualified as the typical student. As Wallace
Donham, who was the second Dean of the Harvard Business School, said:
34. KHURANA, supra note 16, at 159.
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[E]ven here [in the United States] young men enter business too
frequently because they do not feel competent or inclined to enter
any of the so-called learned professions, rather than from a posi-
tive desire to enter upon a business career. Business has thus be-
come in part a catch-all and a dumping ground into which in the
case of many families inferior sons are advised to go.35
As I mentioned, business schools continued to grow dramatically.
Then came the Great Depression, which was the first moment that business
schools really started to look at themselves in the mirror and recognize they
had not really succeeded in the professionalization project. James Bonbright
from Columbia said that, “Our collegiate schools of business have chosen
neither a social nor a private acquisitive goal in the molding of their curric-
ula, which are based not on philosophy but on accident. We have drifted
into the convenient practice of entertaining students with what we know.”36
The following quote could have been cut from this morning’s paper:
Clyde Ruggles at the Harvard Business School said, “We’ve had it brought
home to us in the last few years that there have been relationships between
banks and their affiliates which have militated against the best interest of
the public. That many corporations of all sorts have failed to get the invest-
ing public a truer picture of their earnings as known only too well to many
investors of very moderate means.”37
It was on this that you saw business schools reflecting. The problem
was that business schools were now in their weakest position to address this
issue because most of them were tuition-based models and did not have
large endowments. They were basically in survival mode. There was very
little investment made at this point.
Then came World War II, during which essentially all the business
schools were shut down because of the draft. The few that remained open
were nationalized, like Harvard Business School and Wharton, and focused
on officer training.38
Out of World War II came the GI Bill.39 The GI Bill, as we know,
guaranteed a college education to every individual serviceman.40 This cre-
35. Id. at 46 (quoting Wallace Donham, The Social Significance of Business, in Dedication
Addresses, 5 HARV. BUS. REV. 406 (1927)).
36. Id. at 149 (quoting Annual Meeting, 7 AM. ASSOC. OF COLLEGIATE SCH. OF BUS. PROC.
12 (1928)).
37. Id. at 183 (quoting Annual Meeting, 15 AM. ASSOC. OF COLLEGIATE SCH. OF BUS. PROC.
245, 253 (1936)).
38. KHURANA, supra note 16, at 199 (citing MELVIN THOMAS COPELAND, AND MARK AN
ERA: THE STORY OF THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 117–46 (1958)); ANDREA GABOR, THE
CAPITALIST PHILOSOPHERS: THE GENIUSES OF MODERN BUSINESS, THEIR LIVES, TIMES, AND IDEAS
131–51 (2000)).
39. KHURANA, supra note 16, at 211–13.
40. Id.
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ated a huge influx into colleges and graduate schools of GIs. Guess what
the most popular major was? Business.41
The quality of business education remained low, though, because the
barrier to entry was very low. There were no expensive libraries or labora-
tories. Basically, you could just go out, find a local accountant or local dry
cleaner, and have them teach the courses.
As a result, business education quality did not improve. The GIs then
started complaining to Congress about that, so when Congress renewed the
GI Bill and the Returning Reinvestment Act for the Korean War, they said
that only accredited schools would be eligible.42
During the 1920s, business schools formed the Association to Advance
Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), which was originally a profes-
sionalizing school.43 They organized it a lot like a New England democ-
racy: everybody had an equal vote.44 The AACSB changed its mission to
being an accrediting institution in the 1950s in response to Congress’s re-
quirement.45 Since the weaker schools did not want to be denied the spoils
of the state, there was never a serious attempt to raise the standards.
From this vacuum eventually emerged the Ford Foundation.46 The
Ford Foundation stepped in because they believed the weak quality of busi-
ness education threatened the United States. They thought that poorly-
trained managers would lead to a more radicalized workforce.47
This happened during the McCarthy period in the 1950s, and business
needed to be put on a more sound footing. There were a number of innova-
tions that had been developed during World War II—computer, linear pro-
gramming, and rational approaches to decision-making—which were then
being imported to the Carnegie Graduate School of Industrial Administra-
tion with the thought that they would become the basis for the new model
of business education.48 It was believed that we could not professionalize
the students because we had not yet professionalized the faculty. The domi-
nant idea was that we were going to take the faculty first and train them to
be good researchers. We were going to train them in the quantitative meth-
ods and in the social science disciplines, particularly economics.49
41. Id. at 212 (citing FRANK COOK PIERSON, THE EDUCATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN: A
STUDY OF UNIVERSITY-COLLEGE PROGRAMS IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 7 (1959)).
42. Id. at 213.
43. Id. at 144–46.
44. Id. at 223–28.
45. KHURANA, supra note 16, at 229 (citing AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGIATE
SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS, THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGIATE SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS,
1916–1966 16 (1966)).
46. Id. at 233–235.
47. Id. at 235.
48. See id. at 251–56.
49. Id.
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There is a very particular perspective that economics brings to busi-
ness. Interestingly, this was happening just as the idea that managers should
have prerogative over what happens to the firm was becoming increasingly
contested and delegitimized in the United States.50
In the early 1970s, Milton Friedman published an article in which he
argued that the sole legitimate purpose of the firm should be to maximize
profits.51 This later became manifested and transmuted under Michael Jen-
sen and Bill Meckling to the idea that the sole purpose of the corporation
should be to maximize shareholder value.52
It also coincided with a very significant shift in the nature of owner-
ship and control in the United States, from which a re-concentration of
ownership resulted. Re-concentration was not occurring among large aggre-
gate trusts like the Standard Oil Trust, but rather among institutional inves-
tors who were increasingly arguing for more shareholder access, more say-
on-pay executive compensation.53 This all began in the late 1970s and
1980s.
There was a shift from managerial to investor capitalism.54 The protag-
onist in the business school narrative of the story had always been the man-
ager. The protagonist had held finance, technology, operations
management, and organizational behavior together. Now that protagonist
was lost. As a result, there is a basic breakup among the disciplines and
abandonment of the general management theory of education, which has
not yet been replaced with a different model about the purpose of business.
Michael Jensen and Bill Meckling, the authors of framing and the
agency perspective, created a course that was first introduced at the Univer-
sity of Rochester in the late 1970s called Coordination, Control and the
Management of Organizations (CCMO). The course diffused throughout all
the major business schools within a five-year period.55 The CCMO favored
a move away from the stakeholder’s social responsibility view of business
to a shareholder maximization model.56
They argue that the course was so powerful in creating a particular
point of view that students found that CCMO challenged some of their
deeply felt beliefs. “The course helped students,” Jensen argued, “to be-
come more tough-minded and shifted them away from the stakeholder
50. Id. at 317–26.
51. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine).
52. See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 303
(1976).
53. KHURANA, supra note 16, at 303–04.
54. Id. at 297 (citing MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994)).
55. Id. at 322.
56. Id. at 323.
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model of organizational purpose which was dear to the heart of many of our
students.”57 He went on to talk about how the course would eventually lead
the students to the conclusion that
[T]he weakness of the stakeholder model is the absence of an
overall objective function which implicitly or explicitly specifies
the trade-offs from expenditures on various items. This in turn
implies that the top managers of such organizations cannot be
held accountable for the decisions, because without an overall ob-
jective function there is no way to measure and evaluate the per-
formance. Managers are therefore left free to exercise their own
preferences and prejudices . . . .58
What is interesting about this is that Jensen’s characterization between
tough-minded ideas of shareholder value versus dear-to-the-heart ideas, like
stakeholder models, rejects perhaps one of the most critical elements central
to the profession: the sense of an obligation of the individual to work stead-
ily and reliably at a calling and to rationalize discipline of all activity in
service toward a higher end other than one’s own, which is really the sine
qua non for what a definition of a profession is.
This last point is important because it describes the institutionalization
of agency theory in the minds of students. It is the moment in which agency
theory ceases to be a theory and actually becomes a phenomenological pro-
cess by which certain understandings come to be taken for granted in a type
of shared cognition that takes on “rule-like status in social thought and ac-
tion.”59 In many ways, students, themselves, begin to dramatically change
their views about the purpose of the management. This jumped not only to
the academy, but also to how business leaders started their job.
Look, for example, at the Business Roundtable, and the mission of the
Business Roundtable. They said the imperative of the directors was, prior to
1990, a stakeholder view.60 “The central corporate governance point to be
made about a corporation’s stakeholders beyond the shareholder is that they
are vital to the long-term successful economic performance of the corpora-
tion.”61 In 1997, the Business Roundtable lifted the language of Jensen and
Meckling and said that the sole purpose of the corporation was to maximize
shareholder value, leading to a dramatic change in executive compensation
programs, the issues around what the purpose of management is, and what
the purpose of directors is.
57. Michael C. Jensen et al., Organizations and Markets, in THE INTELLECTUAL VENTURE
CAPITALIST 322 (Thomas K. McCraw & Jeffrey L. Cruikshank eds., 1999).
58. Id.
59. John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as
Myth and Ceremony, 83 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 340, 341 (1977).
60. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
(1990).
61. Id.
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The Business Roundtable thus provides the cover, in many ways, for
self-interested views. Jensen argued that there should be no purpose for
managers to see themselves as professionals.62 They should see themselves
as the hired agents of shareholders.63 Moreover, the particularized charac-
terization of managers as self-interested opportunistic actors changed the
students’ views about what it meant to be a manager.
There are a variety of other things I could talk about: how business
schools came to see themselves as businesses, or how our students were no
longer interested in managerial jobs but, instead, interested in individual
contributor jobs and moving into investment banking and consulting.
In many ways, all of this really does call into question the ethical,
normative, and professional obligations we have now inculcated into an en-
tire generation—thirty years of students. Some of the consequences and
behaviors that seem so irrational to the layperson are those in which they
have been trained to see themselves.
62. KHURANA, supra note 16, at 317–18.
63. Id.
